Anti-BID monoclonal antibody, clone 5B2

Purpose Ambulance service trusts in England have historically had little or no competition for non-emergency patient transport services (NEPTS), but following the imposition of the NHS Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition (PPCC) Regulation (Number 2) 2013, NHS commissioners could accept suitable bids for NEPTS work from third-party commercial competition. This paper describes how NEPTS evolved in England and how an Ambulance Service Trust Board had to step-up their approach to bidding for NHS NEPTS work and to protect their brand and financial position in a competitive commercial market place. Design/methodology/approach The Trust Board developed a competitive bidding strategy with a market research project using "grounded theory" to identify and categorise stakeholders' issues followed by re-engineering to achieve new operational goals. A fundamental element of the bid was an opportunity to share patient information between local NHS facilities using a common access data warehouse. This would represent a serious barrier to entry to any third-party non-NHS commercial competitor. Findings Key projects were identified in the bidding process, including relocation of NEPTS resource bases, use of third-party resources and the establishment of a local NHS-wide data warehouse. They were all self-financing within the contract period and accepted by the commissioners. However, the establishment of NEPTS hubs at hospitals with clinics scattered throughout their grounds was rejected by the commissioners due to incompatibility with existing hospital practices. Originality/value This case study defines the challenges and opportunities faced by an English Ambulance Service Trust Board when responding to an invitation to tender (ITT) from NHS commissioners for NEPTS and competing with third-parties on a commercial basis. Any emergency service would face similar challenges bidding for work in a competitive environment.

We study a symmetric private value auction with signaling, in which the auction outcome is used by an outside observer to infer the bidders' types. We elicit conditions under which an essentially unique D1 equilibrium bidding function exists in the second-price and the English auctions. We establish there is no equivalence between these two auction designs, neither in bidding strategies nor in expected revenue. This is because the presence or the absence of an increasing price clock affects signaling incentives differently in both auction formats, and thereby also the bidders' incentives to overbid their types. This leads to a strictly higher expected revenue in the second-price auction than in the English auction. Our analysis is completed by a comparison with other disclosure policies. Applications include art auctions and charity auctions.