Anti-CDV Monoclonal antibody, Clone 8625

Canine parvovirus (CPV) can cause acute and highly contagious bloody enteritis in dog. To obtain antibodies against CPV, hens were immunized with virus-like particles (VLP) of CPV-VP2. The IgY single chain fragment variables (scFv) were generated by T7 phage display system and expressed inE. colisystem. The titer of the primary scFv library reached to 1.5 x 10(6)pfu/mL, and 95% of the phages contained the target fragments. The CPV-VLP and CPV-VP2 protein showed similar reaction values to the purified scFv in the ELISA test, and the results of ELISA analysis using IgY-scFv toward CPV clinical samples were consistent with commercial immunochromatographic assay (ICA) and PCR detection, the scFv did not show cross reactivity with canine distemper virus (CDV) and canine coronavirus (CCV). IgY-scFv was successfully expressed in CRFK cells, and in the virus suppression assay, 55% of CPV infections were eliminated within 24 h. Docking results demonstrated that the number of amino acids of the binding sides between scFv and VP2 were AA37 and AA40, respectively. This study revealed the feasibility of a novel functional antibody fragment development strategy by generating diversified avian IgY-scFv libraries towards the pathogenic target of interest for both detection and therapeutic purposes in veterinary medicine.

Industrial security is becoming more and more important in the process industry as plant automation systems are being increasingly connected to the office environment and internet. In the meantime, security aspects have also influenced functional safety standards such as IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 (CDV). But there are different targets for safety and security. Safety avoids accidents and damage when a fault occurs and ensures maximum safety for people, processes and the environment. Security protects a machine or plant against unauthorized access by people and against malware, and ensures the availability of the machine or plant. Two questions arise, first, how should security aspects be considered for the Safety Instrumented System (SIS), and second, is a physically separation of the SIS from the Basic Process Control System (BPCS) necessary? The following paper describes SIS security aspects as provided in ISA TR84.00.09, and Industrial Security aspects with additional security layers for the SIS as an integrated approach for SIS & BPCS.